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BOOK NOTICE
NEITHER SAD NOR STRANGE:
RECOVERING THE LOGIC OF ANTICRUELTY
ORGANIZATIONS IN GILDED AGE AMERICA
Bryn Resser Pallesen*
THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENSELESS: PROTECTING ANIMALS AND
CHILDREN IN GILDED AGE AMERICA. By Susan J. Pearson. Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 200.
$45.
INTRODUCTION
In 1877, the American Humane Association ("AHA") incorporated as
one of the first national organizations dedicated to the protection of ani-
mals.1 Nine years later, it amended its constitution to include the protection
of children in its chartered mission.2 By 1908, there were 354 anticruelty or-
ganizations in the United States, 185 of which were, like the AHA, humane
societies invested in the welfare of both animals and children (pp. 2-3). As
primary source documents reveal, Gilded Age humanitarians viewed the joint
pursuit of child and animal protection as entirely sensible (p. 5). One of the
Illinois Humane Society's founding directors, for example, professed that
the "prevention of cruelty to children and to dumb beasts, are part and parcel
of the same work .... -13 By midcentury, however, the logic informing Gild-
ed Age anticruelty reform had been lost, and child welfare professionals
began to criticize the mergence of child protection with animal protection as
an illogical ordering of welfare priorities (p. 5). "It is a sad commentary,"
wrote Dr. Vincent J. Fontana, founder of the Vincent J. Fontana Center for
Child Protection in New York City, "that it took a society for the prevention
of cruelty to animals to protect the first recorded case of a maltreated
child."'4
In The Rights of the Defenseless: Protecting Animals and Children in
Gilded Age America, Professor Susan J. Pearson5 sets herself the task of
* J.D., May 2011, University of Michigan Law School. Associate, White & Case
LLP. Many thanks to the Michigan Law Review editors for their hard work and thoughtful
comments. Thanks also to my family and to Emily Marr.
1. History and Milestones, AM. HUMANE Ass'N, http://www.americanhumane.org/
assets/pdfs/about/history-milestones.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
2. Id.
3. ILL. HUMANE Soc'Y, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1884).
4. VINCENT J. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME
IN CHILDREN 8-9 (1964).
5. Associate Professor of History, Northwestern University.
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recovering the now-forgotten logic of anticruelty reform and the develop-
ment of humane societies in Gilded Age America. Her resulting history
demonstrates that the union of child and animal protection was "neither sad
nor strange, but was instead tightly bound to the crosshatched threads of
sentimentalism and liberalism" (p. 20). Specifically, Pearson argues that
Gilded Age anticruelty reform was a "hybrid" movement-simultaneously
derivative and constitutive of the American state. Drawing on anticruelty
reform publications, popular literature, and histories of antebellum and
postbellum America, she shows how the rhetorical and institutional inno-
vations of anticruelty reform both shaped and were shaped by an ideology
of what she terms "sentimental liberalism." By "[s]peaking a language of
sympathy while deploying legal power," Pearson explains, "anticruelty
reformers transformed not only sentimentalism, but also the reach and role
of the state" (p. 13).
Although Pearson tags Rights of the Defenseless as an "intellectual and
cultural history" (p. 8), it should also be recognized as a legal history-and
an important one at that. Indeed, Rights of the Defenseless is, in many ways,
more a history of the transformation of American legal liberalism (albeit one
told though the voices and actions of Gilded Age humanitarians) than it is a
history of Gilded Age anticruelty reform.6 Accordingly, this Notice engages
Rights of the Defenseless on those terms-that is, as a history of American
legal liberalism. It proceeds in three parts. First, this Notice delivers a sum-
mary of Pearson's argument, paying particular attention to her discussion of
liberalism and leaving her discussion of sentimentalism more or less aside.
Second, it criticizes Pearson's surprisingly abridged treatment of the rela-
tionship between anticruelty reformers' successful expansion of welfare
rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it concludes with an argu-
ment that Rights of the Defenseless is nonetheless an important legal history
because of the work it does to combat the pervasive and persistent myth of
the weak American state.
I. CONTRIBUTIONS
Pearson describes Rights of the Defenseless as an investigation into "the
connection between-and consequences of-animal and child protection"
in Gilded Age America (p. 8). This investigation reveals that the leaders of
anticruelty societies accomplished more than simply the legal protection of
animals and children. Through their strategic efforts to establish recognized
and enforceable legal protections (i.e., rights) for animals and children,
6. For more traditional histories of Gilded Age anticruelty reform, see DIANE L.
BEERS, FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY: THE HISTORY AND LEGACY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); SHERRI BRODER, TRAMPS, UNFIT MOTHERS, AND
NEGLECTED CHILDREN: NEGOTIATING THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA
(2002); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMI-
LY VIOLENCE (1988); ROSWELL C. MCCREA, THE HUMANE MOVEMENT (1910); and JAMES
TURNER, RECKONING WITH THE BEAST: ANIMALS, PAIN, AND HUMANITY IN THE VICTORIAN
MIND (1980).
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these men and women also enlarged the reach and role of the American
state. As Pearson explains, by "[f]reely mixing the language of traditional
liberalism with that of sentimentalism, animal welfare reformers groped
toward a newer, more expansive vision of the rights-bearing community that
would include.., the helpless and dependent" (p. 101).
Pearson begins her history of anticruelty reform and the development of
humane societies in Gilded Age America with a critical examination of why
Gilded Age humanitarians tended to consolidate child and animal protection
under one institutional mantle. To the extent that humane society leaders
addressed the decision to merge child and animal protection functions, they
typically appealed to expedience or, less frequently, the shared helplessness
of children and animals (pp. 21-22, 56). Pearson, however, suggests an al-
ternative explanation for the union of child and animal protection. After
introducing evidence that the protection of children did not, in practice, so
easily meld with the protection of animals (pp. 25-28), she argues that Gild-
ed Age anticruelty reformers' tendency to join child and animal protection is
best explained by nineteenth-century domestic ideology. "Over the course of
the nineteenth century," she writes, "the legal and cultural status of both chil-
dren and animals changed as each was transformed from an economic to a
sentimental investment, from being adjuncts in the family economy to the
center of family affections" (pp. 28-29). In Pearson's view, it was this percep-
tion of children and animals "as natural intimates and family-constituting
beings" rather than arguments about efficiency or shared helplessness that
most fully accounts for the institutional consolidation of child and animal pro-
tection in Gilded Age America (p. 56).
Further, at the same time that children and animals were being trans-
formed into objects of sentimental value, new ideas about discipline were
being "shuttled back and forth across the species line" (p. 29). Emerging
tides in intellectual thought and religious doctrine reenvisioned children and
animals as inherently innocent and good rather than marked by original sin,
and parents' obligations to their children and owners' obligations to their
animals were correspondingly reshaped into duties to preserve goodness
rather than beat out badness (p. 46). Harnessing these new ideas of disci-
pline, anticruelty reformers insisted that the infliction of abuse on a child or
an animal would destroy that individual's inherent innocence and adversely
affect his or her "character and habits in ways that would shape him or her
for life" (p. 90). These reformers further maintained that individual instanc-
es of cruelty exacted harm on the collective social body and thus were
socially problematic. "[A]nimal and child protectionists," Pearson explains,
"saw violence toward animals and children as linked in spirit and practice
and they connected that violence to social disorder-domestic violence,
murder, mayhem" (p. 58).
Although Pearson argues that Gilded Age anticruelty reformers conceived
of cruelty to children and animals as a social problem, she takes care to
emphasize that Gilded Age humanitarians, unlike their more contemporary
Progressive cousins, identified cruelty's origins as personal. That is, Gilded
Age anticruelty reformers "seldom understood cruelty in impersonal or
1215April 20131
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institutional terms" (p. 186), but instead clung to the idea that "cruelty toward
both [children and animals] stemmed from the same dark place in the
human heart" (p. 56). Accordingly, anticruelty reformers sought to protect
children and animals from individual "cruelists" (and, by extension, to
protect society from social disorder) by establishing rights for these
dependent and defenseless populations (p. 99). As Gilded Age
humanitarians saw it, "to end cruelty was also to establish rights" (p. 97).
In the second half of Rights of the Defenseless, Pearson shifts her atten-
tion away from the question of why Gilded Age anticruelty reformers saw a
need for the protection of children and animals to the question of how these
reformers went about establishing and then enforcing rights for children and
animals. One of the biggest challenges anticruelty reformers confronted in
their campaign to establish rights for children and animals was how to rec-
oncile dependence with rights since "the designation of 'dependence' has
worked to mark the boundaries of citizenship, individual rights, and claims
on the state under both feudal and liberal, premodern and modem political
regimes" (p. 102). Drawing on a close reading of anticruelty propaganda,
Pearson argues that anticruelty reformers were able to overcome the signifi-
cant political limitations that typically attached to the designation of
dependence by identifying an alternative basis for rights: sentience (i.e., the
ability to feel). Because children and animals could feel the physical pain of
abuse and neglect, Gilded Age humanitarians contended that they should be
protected from such suffering. "In basing rights on sentience rather than
reason or independence, and in attempting to reconcile rights with depend-
ence," she explains, "anticruelty reformers developed a vision of rights
based on protection rather than liberty" (p. 133).
Whatever their foundation, however, rights are essentially meaningless
unless they are both enforceable and enforced. Unlike other Gilded Age re-
form and charity groups, most humane societies, though privately organized,
were authorized to engage in the law enforcement activities necessary to
carry out their protective functions (pp. 3, 151-52). 7 Writing in 1885, one
leader of anticruelty reform identified these delegated police powers as es-
sential to the success of Gilded Age anticruelty reform efforts. "[I]n this
case," he stated, "the dove has claws-sharp claws-and uses them, too, as
it has occasion" (p. 152; internal quotation marks omitted). In her final
chapter, Pearson also argues that the delegation of police powers was crucial
to anticruelty organizations' ability to protect the rights of the defenseless
because the delegation of police powers allowed anticruelty organizations to
translate action into sympathy backed by the power of the state. In other
words, while Gilded Age anticruelty organizations relied on sentiment to
enact anticruelty legislation, they relied on their police powers to enforce
such legislation (pp. 138, 151-52).
By using the law and law enforcement to protect the rights of children
and animals, anticruelty reformers transformed the very machinery they
deployed. As Pearson writes, "Without developing a theory, as some later
'As Pearson puts it, "they distributed arrest warrants rather than alms" (p. 3).
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progressive reformers would, about state responsibility for animal and child
protection, anticruelty activists had nonetheless succeeded in insinuating
their priorities in the machinery and the identity of the states in which they
operated" (p. 181). What is more, by using law to effect anticruelty reform,
Gilded Age humanitarians "stood at the crossroads of postbellum transfor-
mations in governance" (p. 138) and helped give shape to the modem
American state and its understanding of rights for both the powerful and the
defenseless.
H1. CRITIQUE
In 1869, Professor George Ticknor reflected on the fundamental dissi-
militude between pre- and post-Civil War America: "It does not seem to me
as if I were living in the country in which I was born, or in which I received
whatever I ever got of political education or principles. '8 Nearly sixty years
later, Professors Charles and Mary Beard echoed Ticknor's sapient observa-
tion in describing the Civil War as the "Second American Revolution."9
Today, historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century America continue to
identify the Civil War as the point of departure of the modem American
state. In his book on law and regulation in nineteenth-century America, for
example, Professor William Novak writes that "[t]he Civil War played mid-
wife to the American liberal state."10
In Rights of the Defenseless, Pearson also identifies the Civil War as a
turning point in the story of legal liberalism and the American state. "[T]he
Civil War," she writes, "lent a renewed vigor to the language of rights and
reopened questions about the entailments of many of the keywords in the
American political lexicon: freedom, rights, independence, and citizenship"
(p. 101; internal quotation marks omitted). Further, she recognizes that the
reopening of these questions provided Gilded Age anticruelty reformers
with the opportunity to expand the country's understanding of rights to in-
clude entitlements for children and animals: "For animal [and child]
protectionists, framing their claims in rights language was not only a strate-
gic choice to deploy a dominant idiom, but also a way of intervening in the
postbellum debate about the grounding and the content of rights" (p. 101).
8. 2 GEORGE TICKNOR, LIFE, LETTERS, AND JOURNALS OF GEORGE TICKNOR 485
(George Stillman Hillard ed., 7th ed., Boston, James R. Osgood & Co. 1877).
9. 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
54 (MacMillan Co. rev. ed. 1937); see also id. at 53 ("[A]t bottom the so-called Civil War...
was a social war, ending in the unquestioned establishment of a new power in the government,
making vast changes in the arrangement of classes, in the accumulation and distribution of
wealth, in the course of industrial development, and in the Constitution inherited from the
Fathers.").
10. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1996). See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED
STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1997); AMY DRU
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN
THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
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But Pearson's analysis does not go far enough. Rights of the
Defenseless's central argument-that Gilded Age anticruelty reformers
enlarged the reach and role of the American state through their efforts to
secure a positive, individual right (i.e., the right to protection) for two rights-
less populations-is inextricably related to the complex history of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and in particular the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet nowhere in Rights of the Defenseless's otherwise well-researched and
tightly argued pages does Pearson meaningfully attend to the constitutional
underpinnings that transformed the meaning and substance of rights in Gilded
Age America and thereafter. She does not, for example, explain how the letter
and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally transformed our
conception of rights to mean individual rather than collective liberties." Nor
does she discuss how the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment left uncertain the meaning and reach of its
protections. 12 Indeed, Pearson mentions the Fourteenth Amendment only a
handful of times, and when she does, she ignores years of legal debate and
precedent by matter-of-factly stating that "the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Bill of Rights to the states."' 3
If Pearson had intended for Rights of the Defenseless to be a
straightforward history of anticruelty organizations at the turn of the
twentieth-century, her failure to address the Fourteenth Amendment in
substantive terms would, most likely, not even merit mention. But because of
Pearson's admirable aspiration to attach her history of anticruelty reform in
the Gilded Age to the larger narrative of American legal liberalism, her
superficial treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment and its complicated
history is unfortunate. In particular, her discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment perpetuates the common misconception that the Bill of Rights
meant the same thing in pre-Civil War America that it does today.14
Moreover, by failing to substantively address the Fourteenth Amendment,
Pearson forfeits an opportunity to even more concretely connect her history
of anticruelty reform to the history of American legal liberalism and the
transformation of the meaning and content of those rights.
11. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
xiii (1998) ("[T]he Reconstruction Amendment transformed the nature of the original Bill of
Rights, leaving us with something much closer to the Bill as conventionally understood to-
day."); NOVAK, supra note 10, at 244 ("But the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments were no simple textual revisions. Much like the sic utere tuo and salus populi
maxims they ultimately replaced, the constitutional clauses 'involuntary servitude,' 'privileges
or immunities,' 'due process,' 'equal protection,' and 'right of citizens of the United States'
embodied a wholly new political philosophy. The heart of that philosophy was a radical re-
construction of individual rights.").
12. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 197-99 (1986) (summarizing the Fuller, White, and Taft
Courts' Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
13. P. 101; see also p. 165 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states ....").
14. See supra note 10.
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III. RESUSCITATION
Despite Pearson's much-abridged treatment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Rights of the Defenseless is an important legal history. Namely,
Pearson's history of Gilded Age anticruelty reform profoundly undermines
the intertwined narratives of the laissez-faire Gilded Age and the weak
American state and presents an alternative (and more accurate) picture of
how law and the state functioned in Gilded Age America.
As the typical American history student learns, the orthodox history of
the United States draws a sharp distinction between the laissez-faire Gilded
Age and the well-regulated Progressive Era.15 Over the years, a number of
voices have challenged the veracity of this distinction, especially the charac-
terization of Gilded Age America as a relatively deregulated society. In
1887, for example, Dr. Albert Shaw of Minneapolis argued against the asser-
tion "that laissez-faire is the practical rule in the United States, and state
interference the rare exception,' 1 6 noting that there was really nothing new
for future legislatures to regulate. 17 And in 1944, Karl Polanyi also dissented
from the orthodox story by professing that the emergence of the market
economy was in no way a product of laissez-faire governance but instead
was the product of frequent government interventions. 8 More recently, Wil-
liam Novak and others of the same persuasion have continued to challenge
the myth of the weak American state. 'The nineteenth century," Novak ar-
gues, "was not an era of laissez-faire or statelessness where public inertia
and political naivetd just happened to provide the perfect conditions for a
burgeoning private market economy and a self-generating civil democra-
cy.' 9 Rather, nineteenth-century America was a "well-regulated society" in
which there was a remarkable amount of governmental activity throughout
the United States, much of it occurring at the local and state level.2"
Echoing the critiques put forth by these scholars, Pearson concludes that
Gilded Age America was "hardly a stateless society" (p. 177). Indeed, her
15. See NOVAK, supra note 9, at 250 nn. 7-9 (listing authorities adhering to the ortho-
dox history).
16. Comment and Criticism, 9 ScL 503, 503 (1887) (attributing this assertion to George J.
Goschen, Chancellor of the British Exchequer); see also Albert Shaw, The American State and
the American Man, 51 CONTEMP. REV. 695 (1887) (noting Goschen's argument and rebutting it).
17. See Shaw, supra note 16, at 710.
18. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 136-38 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944)
(discussing the British government's acts to encourage economic growth). Although The Great
Transformation is about the rise of the market economy in Britain, its contentions apply with
equal force to American economic history.
19. NOVAK, supra note 10, at 236 ('The nineteenth century was not an era of laissez-faire
or statelessness where public inertia and political naivet6 just happened to provide the perfect
conditions for a burgeoning private market economy and a self-generating civil democracy"); see
also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 9-10
(1992) (noting that laissez-faire was inapplicable to common law); William J. Novak, The Myth
of the "Weak" American State, 113 AM. HIST. REv. 752, 753-54 (2008) (criticizing the tradi-
tional view of the American state as weak).
20. NOVAK, supra note 9, at 1-2, 235-37.
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study of anticruelty reform and the development of humane societies in
Gilded Age America provides considerable support for the thesis that legal
regulation and positive statecraft permeated nineteenth-century America.
Specifically, Pearson shows that Gilded Age anticruelty reformers actively
depended on the law and the power of the state to first establish and then
enforce rights of the defenseless. "[H]umane societies had no doubt," she
argues, "that the law-as an idea and as a set of institutions-was critical to
their mission" (p. 166).
In addition to work it does in rethinking the orthodox history of the
United States, Pearson's history provides some explanation for why the or-
thodox history has proved so durable despite an increasing volume of
dissenting scholarship. Gilded Age anticruelty organizations were private as-
sociations separate from the state. Yet, as described in Rights of the
Defenseless, it was these organizations rather than public Officals that "se-
cur[ed] legislation that specified, in ever more detail, how animals and
children were to be governed" (p. 181). And it was anticruelty reformers ra-
ther than a formal police force that "roamed the streets wearing badges that
entitled them to arrest violators of state anticruelty statutes and relevant mu-
nicipal ordinances" (p. 152). In effect, Gilded Age anticruelty societies
expanded governmental power under private auspices at the local and state
level, allowing the image of American voluntarism to overshadow the Amer-
ican state.
CONCLUSION
In Rights of the Defenseless, Pearson undertakes to write a history of an-
ticruelty reform and the development of humane societies in Gilded Age
America. Drawing on a careful study of primary and secondary source ma-
terial, her subsequent history recovers the logic informing anticruelty
organizations' later-criticized joint pursuit of child and animal protection
and explains how Gilded Age anticruelty reformers went about establishing
and then enforcing the right to protection for children and animals. But
Pearson does not stop there. Instead, she attaches her history of anticruelty
reform to the larger history of the transformation of American legal liberal-
ism, adding appreciably to our understanding of how law and regulation
functioned in Gilded Age America. As this Notice has suggested, Pearson
more than accomplishes the impressive task she had set for herself.
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